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In The S11preme Court
of the State of Utah
STE'PHEN FRANK HYDE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsLAURI LEE HYDE,

Case No.
11463

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEP
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a divorce action by respondent, Steven Frank
Hyde, (hereinafter referred t0 as "plaintiff"), against appellant, Lauri Lee Hyde, (hereina:fter referred to as "defendant"), involving the custody of the rninor daughter of
the parties, Shelice Hyde, age two years.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Upon the evidence presented at trial, the trial court
decreed that the plaintiff he granted a divorce from the defendant and that the plaintiff be awarded the care, custody
and control of the minor daughter of the parties, subject
to reasonable rights of visitation by the defendant. Subse·

2

quent to the entry of the decree, the defendant made motion fo.r a new trial and to amend the findings. Pursuant to
defendant'·s tnotfon and the hearing thereon, the trial court
denied the motion for a new trial but ordered that the decree of divorce should be amended to grant defendant reasonable and liberal rights of visitation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks a reversal of the decree in so far
as it grants custody of the minor child of the parties to
plaintiff and requests that custody be granted to defendant
or in the alternative that a new trial be ordered as to the
question of custody of the minor daughter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaint'iff and defendant were married at Centerville,
Utah, February 25, 1966, and on the 20th day of September
1966, a babYc daughter, Shelice Hyde, was b'orn as issue of
the parties." 1~ediately following the marriage, plaintiff
and defendant moved to Logan, Utah, for a short time while
the plaintiff completed the academic quarter at Utah State
University. The parties then moved to Centerville, Utah,
where they resided for a brief period with defendant's paro: 7Mt.:.")
ents and then moved into a house in Centerville.1°0n November 2, 1967, as a consequem::e of conflict and emotional stress
between defendant and plaintiff, and having arranged with
her mother to care for the child in her absence, defendant
traveled to Phoenix, Arizona for the purpose,,
,pf rest and
( , 141.s)
reassessment of her relationship to plaintif'f.A While there
she received psychi atric therapy from psychiatrist John H.
Jarvis, M.D. U ~ .. + 11 )
1

3

During the time that defendant was in Phoenix, Arizona, the baby daughter of the partie's was cared for by
the defendant's mother in her home with assistance from
(f{; <f ,L? ,.,'/I
plaintiff.10n or'a:bout the 9th day of January, 1968, plaintiff filed an action for divorce against defendant on the
grounds of mE:ntal cruelty and asked for custody of the
baby daughter of the parties. The parties discussed the
matter for some time and when it bec ame apparent th'at the
problems of the marriage and the custody of 'the baby daughter could not be amicably resolved, defendant retained counsel and began legal action to obtain custody of her child.
1

If; 3)

On March 25, 1968, a motion for order granting defendant temporary custody of the child was filed. A hearing on
that motion which required testimony c'ould not be scheduled
by the trial court for hearing until April 23, 1968. At that
time defendant presented argument and a memorandum in
support of her motion for temporary custody. Pl·aintiff was
given ten days to file a memorandum of authorities and the
court ordered that plaintiff have cu st o d y of the
minor child until a decision was rendered. Because of the
trial court's heavy calendar, defendant's motion could not
be rescheduled to be heard until June 17, 1968. On that day
testimony of defendant and Dr. John H. Jarvis was heard
by the c'ourt, but the matter was not concluded. Counsel
for defendant pointed out that a temporary order granted
custody to the plaintiff during the proceedings and urged
that the matter be concluded as rapidly as po'ss~"le. The
trial judge stated that a hearing would be set in the immediate future, (R. 7 at p. 58), but the next available time
on the c'ourt's schedule was three months la'ter, September
10, 1968, at which time defendant testified as did plaintiff
and Dr. Edmund C. Evans.
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After 'all evidence was in, the court granted plaintiff
a divorce, took the matter of custody under advisement and
on September 13, 1968, ruled that defendant was not a fit
and proper person to be awarded the care and control of the
7 f- r"l J
minor child.< On September 24, 1968, the court signed the
decree of divorce and defendant filed a motion for new trial
on October 2, 1968. The trial court heard arguments of counsel on October 15, 1968, took the motion under advisement
l( ,,,
and on November 29, 1968, ruled denying the motion.~Thereupon defendant, on December 17, 1968, filed a notice of appeal. The court reporter, because of his heavy workload,
was unable to prepare the transcript until February 20, 1969,
and an order was signed granting an extension of time for
filing the record on appeal. The record on appeal was filed
on February 20, 1969.
PLAINTIFF'S POSITION
The trial court's decision should be reversed and custody granted to defendant upon the following grounds:
1

1.

The evidence f'ail'S to support the following findings

of the trial court :
(a) The defendant is not a fit and proper person
to have the c'are, custody and control of the minor
child of the parties. (R. 9)
(b) [The defendant] in other ways demonstrated
that she is not able to care for 'the child and is not
a fit and proper person to have the care, custody and
control of the child. (R. 9)
(c) The defendant i's suffering from a great emotional instability. (R. 9)
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( d) [The defendant's] absenting herself from the
home was not for the welfare of the child, but 'for
her fear of her inadequacies. (R. 9)
( e) That it is for the best interest of the child that
the child remain with the father and be placed in
his care, custody and c'ontrol. (R. 9)
(f) The "demonstrated stability" of the father warrants that the child remain with the father and be
pl'aced in his care, custody and control. (R. 9)
2. The evidence presented at trial indicates that the
defendant is a fit and proper person to receive the care,
cus'tody and contro'l of the minor daughter of the parties.
3. The tdal court erred in denying defendant's motion for a new 'trial on the basis that the findings failed to
conform to the evidence.

ARGUMENT
POIN'T I
PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
DEFENDANT IS AN UNFIT MOTHE'R AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET THIS BURDEN.
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged the universally reC'ognized presumption that it is for t<he bes't interest
and welfare of 'a child of tender years to be wi'th her mother
and the mother's right to custody should not be denied unless it is shown that she is such an immoral, incompetent or
otherwise improper person that it would be contr ary to the
child's best interest and welfare to be in her custody.
Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d 230 (1964);
Ryan v. Ryan, 17 Utah 2d 44, 404 P.2d 247 (1965); Chase v.
1
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Chase, 15 Utah 2d 81, 387 P.2d 556 (1963); Steiger v. Steiger,
4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 (1956); Briggs v. Briggs, 111
Utah 418, 181 P.2d 223 (1947).
The a'bove cited cases repeat the position that a presumption exists tlhat the best interest and weHare of a child
of tender years is served by awarding custody to the mother,
and the fat:iher has the burden of proving that the mother
is not a fit and proper person to be given custody of the
child.
The first consideration, therefore, is whether or not
phintif'f overcame the presumption that exists in defendant's favor and proved that she is an unfit mother.
Plaintiff called Dr. Edmund C. Evans, the pediatrician
who cared for the minor child. He testified that he had cared
for the child since her birth and had seen plaintiff and
defendant on many occasions when they brought the baby
in for regular visits. He testified that both parents are fine
young people who have the poten'tial of practically anything they would care to aim at and accomplish. (R. 6 at p. 7)
He further testified that both plaintiff and defendant have
great strength of character and tha't either one 'of them could
be an excellent parent of their child. (R. 6 at p. 7)
Dr. Evans further testified that since returning from
Arizona, defendant has equipped herself 'to make a living
independently, projected her plans for the future and reestablished her relationship with her parents. (R. 6 at p. 7)
The best '1!hat can be said for the testimony of Dr. Evans
is that he believes defendant's performance of her capabilities over a ten rnonth period was poor and that the sort of illness he "suspects" she has is not easily cured. (R. 6 at p. 7, 8)
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Nothing could be more vague. He did not state what
defendant had done or had failed to do as a mother, did not
say she didn't adequately care for the child but only that in
his opinion her performance was below her capabilities. (R. 6
at p. 7)
As to Dr. Evans' testimony relative to defendant's so
called illness it is important to note that this witness is not
trained in psychiatry but in pediatrics and that 'the trained
psychiatrist, Dr. John Jarvis, testified that defendant is capable of appropriately and wisely caring for her child and
that she is a very healthy person, vital and quite capable
of warmth and understanding. (R. 6 at p. 25) He further
testified that she has no disorder of thought but had been
dis'traugh't and quite anxious as a result of her being
estranged from her husband and parents. (R. 7 at p. 23)
Looking at the evidence produced by plaintiff through
Dr. Evans, no unfitness was revealed and nothing wa:s introduced to show the best interest O'f the child would not
be best served by granting defendant cus'tody.
The only other direct evidence introduced by plaintiff
was his own testimony. He, more than 'anyone, would be
aware of defendant's conduct, if any, th'at would show her
lack of fitness as a mother. Careful reading of plaintiff's
testimony reveals that no statement is made showing defendant did not properly care for the child and on cro,ss
examination, plainti'ff substantiated defendant's testimony
to the effect that her trip to Phoenix was 'thoroughly discussed and agreed upon and plans for the care of the child
were made before the defendant left. (R. 7 at p. 123, 124)
By comparison, in Briggs v. Briggs, supra, the mother
didn't get along with the children, went out with friends
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and left the children with the father, became angry easily
and on three or four occasions whipped the children on account of disobedience-custody award to the mother upheld; in Steiger v. Steiger, supra, the evidence was that the
mother drank intoxicating liquors, had frequently been seen
with other men and was not a g·ood housekeeper-custody
award to the father reversed; in Dearden v. Dearden, supra,
the proof showed that the mother had committed adultery,
the court held that this alone did not show unfitness custody award to mother upheld; in Stuber v. Stuber, 121
Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 (1952) the mother cou'ldn't care for
the child immediately but the grandrnother could do so
and the mother lived with a man whom she intended to
marry-·custody award to mother upheld.
Looking at the evidence produced by plaintiff in the
cross ex•arnination of defendant, the record, while not clear,
indkates she was out of the home in the presence of another
man just prior to her trip to Arizona (R. 7 a:t p. 96), also
that she went to dinner with other fellows who lived in
the same apartment building in Phoenix. (R. 7 at p. 100)
Further, she do·es not deny dating men after her return to
Salt Lake during the period of separation, but such dating
oC'turred only during hours when the biaby was asleep. (R. 7
at p. 102)
The above C'onduct on the part of defendant, when
viewed again'st the background of the conflict 'and breakdown of communicat'ions between the parties, appears to be
an outgrowth of the conflict. There is no testimony to the
effect that thi·s conduct harmed the welfare and proper devel•opment of her child nor rendered defendant an unfit
mother incapable of providing and caring for the welfare
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and interests of her child. This evidence is insufficient to
deprive defendant of the custody of her daughter under the
moral standc:rds 0 f our community and under the decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court, specifically the C'ase of Smith v.
Smith, 9 Utah 2d 157, 340 P.2d 419 (1959) wherein Justice
Henroid stated:
1

There is no evidence that plaintiff was immoral or
indiscreet in the presence or sight of her children,
unless it be immorality or indiscretion to permit another man to visit her after t'he marriage for all intents ·and purpose was an impotent and ended circumstance. We think such visitation without any
further evidence of any indiscretion indulged in the
presence or sight of her children, cann·ot brand her
as being an unfit mother to have the custody of her
own children, and absent such evidence, the presumption that she was a fit and proper person calls
upon us to send this case back with instructions to
enter a 'finding of fact to the eHect that plaintiff
here is a fit and proper person to have custody
under the conditions of the decree a:s we have construed i t. Such is the order.
1

POINT II
THE RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
ISSUE OF CUSTODY.
The trial court found that defendant left the child in
the custody and control of the plaintiif'f and absented herself for five months and as a result thereof is an unfit
mother.
Defendant testified that bef'ore leaving for Arizona she
and plainti'ff 'thoroughly discussed her leaving and arranged
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for the proper care o{ the child in her absence. (R. 7 at p. 4,
S, 73) Plaintiff also testified that arrangements for the care
of the child had been discussed before defendant left. (R. 7
at p. 123, 124)
The trip to Arizona was not an impulsive act by
defendant without regard for the welfare of her child but
an agreed course of action designed to solve a problem. Having struggled with the conflict with her husband for some
time with little apparent success in resolving the conflict, it
appears log;_cal that defendant would consider a vacation
from the situation for the purpose of gaining perspective
and insight into the marriage problems. In so doing, as previously noted, defendant made arrangements for the care
of her child in her absence. Defendant's testimony shows
that she had s'ome degree of sophistication and insigh't into
the conflicts which enveloped her by reason of her making a
rational 'approach to solving tlhese conflicts and putting herse'1f in a better position to care for the needs of her child.
(R. 7 at p. 5, SS) Based on the effect which the stay in Arizona had on defendant, it appears that the long range welfare interests of the minor child were not obstructed but in
reality enhanced by the defendant's stay and therapy in Arizona. (R. 6 a:t p. 11, 107)
This stay in Arizona was clearly the culmination of
frustration experienced by defendant. This is not the situation where a mother, responsible for the welfare of her
child, simply cannot be depended upon to be with her child
to care for the child's needs, or the situation where a mother
repeatedly leaves her child unattended for extended periods
of 'time, nor is this the case where the mother has abandoned the child for a period of time without prior arrange-
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ments or without knowledge that the child is being properly
cared for. None of these being the situation in this case, the
trial court was not justified in depriving this infant child of
the daily love and attention of her mother.
The trial court found that the defendant in "other ways
demonstrated that she is not able to care for the child .... "
(R. 9) In reviewing the testimony of all witnesses, defendant is unable to ascertain the "other ways" referred to
in this finding.
The trial court found that defendant is suffering from
great emotional instability. (R. 9) This finding cannot be
supported by the evidence. Quite to the contrary is the
testimony of Dr. Jarvis and Dr. Evans that the defendant is
capable of adequate'ly caring for the needs of her daughter.

(R. 6 at p. 7, 12) (R. 7 at p. 25)
The finding that defendant was fearful that she would
receive the rejection of her own child relates solely to the
period preceding her stay in Phoenix, Arizona. Again to the
contrary, the testimony of the defendant indicates that fears
of rejection once experienced by her had been overcome
and that defendant, s'ince her return from Arizona, has been
able to relate in a mature way to her parents, her child and
others, (R. 7 at p. 108) and her testimony in this regard is
substantiated by Dr. Jarvis (R. 7 at p. 25, 26) and Dr. E,vans
(R. 6 at p. 7, 11, 12)
The finding that it was in the best interest of the child
for the father to have the child "bec'ause of the demonstrated stability of the father" (R. 9) has no factual basis
in the evidence. Other than the testimony o.f the plaintiff in-
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dicating that he is able to make arrangements for the care
of the child during his absence, defendant finds no other
evidence indicating the "demonstrated sta'bility o'f the
father." In fact, the uncontroverted testirnony of defend'ant
relating to the discussions of the parties with Mrs. Garrett,
the marriage counselor, indicates that Mrs. Garrett recommended that plaintiff seek psychological assistance from a
professional person whic'h he failed 'to do. (R. 7 at p. 82, 132)
Also, Dr. Evans testified that the plaintiff was somewhat
rigid in his approach to relationships wit'h others and had
some difficulty relating with women and girls. (R. 6 at p.
10)
Looking only a't the worst in defendant, the finding oif
unfitness has no hasis, but the record also sets forth the
love and affection she has for her daughter. Defendant testified and this testimony is uncontroverted, that she never
yeUed or screamed at or hurt her daughter but did attempt
to discipline the child. (R. 7 at 12).
Defendant never left the baby without insuring that
she was in C'apable hands, (R. 7 at p. 9, 10, 11) and her deep
love and concern for the child was evident to Dr. Jarvis.
(R. 7 at 19, 24, 26)
Cases exi,st in this jurisdiction where,in custody of children of tender ye'ars has been granted to the father but only
where a clear showing of unfitness of the mother exists.
In McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961
(1963), the evidence was that the mother had committed indiscretions wi'th other men, arrived home at early rnorning
hours under the influence of alcohol rendering her unable to
care for the child and her time away from home was spent
in taverns and bars. It was also established that she had
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been prone to use unseemly language in the presence of the
children and a number of salacious stories and other obscene
materials were kept by her within easy reach oif the children.
No such conduct can be imputed to the defendant herein.
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 101, 417 P.2d 118
(1966), the father was awarded custody upon a showing
among other things that the mother had taken a couple of
safaris through several states with a girl friend and two
"gentlemen."
Here again, no such conduct can be imputed to defendant herein.
CONCLUSION
In divorce cases, this court may review the evidence
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
if that is warranted, Dearden v. Dearden, supra, and the reversal of the tri'al court in this case is clearly warranted
by the evidence:
1.

Plaintiff failed to sustain his burden, as established

by this court, of showing that defendant's conduct is of
such a nature as to hazard the welfare of the child and
make it unwise that she be in her mother's custody. Dearden
v. Dearden, supra.

2. The findings of the trial court pertaining to the
unfitness of defendant and the fitness of plaint'iff are not
supported by the. e.viden·ce presented at trial; but to the
contrary, the testimony of Dr. Evans and Dr. Jarvis, the
only witnesses . other than the parties, clearly establish
1
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that the deifendant is fit and fully capable of caring for the
welfare and best interests of her daughter.
3. The evidence indicates a true love and concern on
the part of defendant for her infant daughter.
The delays in the trial of this matter occasioned by the
trial court schedule have been most unfortunate but should
not 'in any way serve to deprive the infant child of the daily
fove and attention of her mother inasmuch as defondant
pushed the case along as rapidly as possible, and during the
trial court proceedings and during the pendency of this
appeal, deifendant has exercised her reasonable and liberal
rights of visitation by keeping the child with her an aver·age
of two full days, including overnight, each week.
The defondant respectfully requests that the decision
of the trial court pertaining to custody of the minor child
be reversed and that custody be given to defendant subject
to reasonable visitation rights to the plaintiff and further
requests that the case be remanded for determination of a
proper amount to be paid by plaintiff for the support of
the child.
Respectfully submitted,
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